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Abstract—Network monitoring applications are prone to con-
tinuous overload situations due to the extreme and highly
variable data rates of network trafﬁc, trafﬁc anomalies and
network attacks. These overload situations can have a severe and
unpredictable impact on the accuracy of monitoring applications,
right when they are most valuable to network operators.
Load shedding via trafﬁc sampling has recently been proposed
as an effective alternative to overprovisioning for efﬁciently
handling overload situations in network monitoring. However, not
all monitoring applications are robust against sampling and often
other techniques can be devised to shed load more effectively.
In order to provide a generic solution for arbitrary applica-
tions, we propose a load shedding scheme that, besides supporting
standard sampling techniques, allows network monitoring appli-
cations to deﬁne custom load shedding methods. The main novelty
of our approach is that the monitoring system can delegate the
task of shedding excess load to applications in a safe manner
and still achieve robustness in the presence of non-cooperative
and selﬁsh users.
We use real-world packet traces and deploy a real implementa-
tion of our load shedding scheme in a large university network in
order to show the robustness of our monitoring system against
deliberate trafﬁc anomalies and queries that fail to shed load
correctly. Our results also show that the monitoring system is
able to preserve a high degree of accuracy and fairness during
extreme overload conditions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Developing and deploying network monitoring applications
for large enterprise network or service providers present
several familiar challenges. Applications have to deal with
continuous trafﬁc streams from a large number of high speed
data sources. They have to operate across a wide range of net-
work devices, transport technologies, hardware architectures
and system conﬁgurations. Furthermore, applications have no
control over the input rate and need to be provisioned correctly
to handle trafﬁc burst or sudden increase in the computation
requirements. To add to the complexity of building monitoring
applications, there is a growing demand from network opera-
tors to obtain an ever more detailed representation of the trafﬁc
traversing the network to improve the end-user experience and
the overall “health” of the infrastructure [1]–[3].
As a result, the network measurement research commu-
nity has put forward several proposals aiming at reducing
the burden on the developers of monitoring applications. A
common approach among the various proposal is to abstract
away the inner workings of the measurement infrastructure [4],
[5] and allow arbitrary monitoring applications, developed
independently by third parties, to run effectively on a shared
measurement infrastructure [5]–[8].
One of the key differences from previous designs is that
these systems are not tailor-made for a single speciﬁc appli-
cation, but instead can handle multiple, concurrent and com-
peting monitoring applications. In this context, the monitoring
system has to guarantee fair access to the system resources
(e.g., processor cycles, memory space and bandwidth) across
all monitoring applications. This is even more true during
overload situations due to extreme trafﬁc conditions or other
anomalies that could be malicious (e.g., denial of service
attacks or worm infections) or unexpected (e.g., network mis-
conﬁgurations,ﬂash crowds). During these events, the resource
requirements of the applications could easily overwhelm the
system leading to unpredictable results, or even interrupted
service, right when the measurements are the most valuable to
the network operators. Unfortunately, proposed system designs
do not directly address this problem while the alternative of
over-provisioningto handle peak data rates or worst case trafﬁc
mix is in general not economically feasible.
In order to address this problem, in a previous work [9]
we proposed a load shedding scheme that operates without
any explicit knowledge of the internal implementation and
cost of the monitoring applications, and without relying on
any speciﬁc model for the incoming trafﬁc. This way, the
monitoring system can preserve a high degree of ﬂexibility,
allowing for fast implementation and deployment of new
monitoring applications. In contrast, previous solutions require
perfect knowledge of either the system implementation [10] or
the cost and selectivity of each query operator [11]–[13].
Our load shedding scheme (brieﬂy reviewed in Section III)
builds an online prediction model of the resource requirements
of each monitoring application by continuously observing the
correlation between its actual resource usage and a large set
of trafﬁc features (that summarize the main characteristics
of the input trafﬁc). This prediction is used to anticipate
overload situations and discard part of the incoming trafﬁc
using standard sampling techniques, such as packet or ﬂow
sampling, to avoid uncontrolled packet losses even in front of
highly variable workloads.
The main limitation of this approach is the lack of support
for those monitoring applications that are not robust to packet
or ﬂow sampling. Those applications however could return
accurate results in presence of more advanced load shedding
mechanisms. In this paper we extend our load shedding2
scheme to support custom load shedding methods deﬁned
by the end users. The main novelty of our scheme is that
it allows the monitoring system to safely delegate the task
of shedding excess load to untrusted applications and still
guarantee fairness of service among non-cooperative users.
Similar custom load shedding solutions proposed for other
systems [14] require applications to behave in a collaborative
fashion, which is not possible in an open environment. Our
method instead is able to automatically police applications
that do not implement custom load shedding methods properly.
This is an important feature given that applications may fail
to shed the correct amount of load (due to inherent limita-
tions) or refuse to do so (maliciously or due to an incorrect
implementation).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents in greater detail the related work. Section III intro-
duces the basic architecture of our monitoring system and
reviews the design of its load shedding scheme. We describe
how users can safely deﬁne custom load shedding mechanisms
in Section IV and validate the method in Section V. Section VI
presents a performance evaluation of an actual implementation
of our system using real-world packet traces, while Section VII
shows the results we obtained when deploying the system in
a large university network. Finally, Section VIII concludes the
paper and discusses future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Data processing systems that deal with live input streams are
becoming increasingly common.These systems present several
particularities, such as their push-based nature and support for
continuous queries, that make the problem of handling over-
load situations challenging and different from that addressed in
traditional systems. Examples of such systems include, apart
from network monitoring systems, those commonly known as
data stream management systems (DSMS) [15].
In the context of DSMS, the standard solution to the
overload problem is known as load shedding. Load shedding
is the process of dropping excess load in such a way that the
system remains stable and no overﬂow occurs in the system
buffers. Load shedding in Aurora [11] and STREAM [12]
consists of dropping unprocessed tuples by automatically
inserting drop operators into query plans, such that the impact
on the utility of the system is minimized. TelegraphCQ [13]
implements instead an architecture called Data Triage, which
uses summarization techniques to provide approximate and
delay-bounded answers in the presence of overload.
These solutions require queries to be built out of small
set of operators, whose cost and selectivity are assumed to
be known. This signiﬁcantly limits the ﬂexibility of these
solutions to be used for network monitoring, where there is
a clear need for supporting arbitrary trafﬁc queries and com-
plex monitoring applications that cannot be easily expressed
using standard declarative languages [5]. In contrast, our load
shedding scheme can handle arbitrary monitoring applications
and operate without any explicit knowledge of their actual
implementation.
Ref. [14] proposes an interesting collaborative load shed-
ding approach for media-based applications that resembles
our idea of custom load shedding. However, [14] requires
applications to behave in a cooperative fashion and does not
deﬁne any explicit enforcement policy, but relies on a social
welfare assumption that is not met in our scenario.
In network monitoring, the load shedding problem has not
been extensively studied yet. Most solutions in this context try
to avoid overload situations using specialized hardware [16]
and as such are only viable as short term solutions. More
sophisticated monitoring systems implement packet ﬁltering,
trafﬁc sampling and/or data aggregation techniques [10], [17]–
[19]. However, these techniques are either designed to handle
overload situations only in the collection devices [17]–[19] or
limited to a set of pre-deﬁned trafﬁc reports [10], while in this
work we focus on the problem of handling multiple, arbitrary
monitoring applications with unknown and variable cost.
Similar open network monitoring infrastructures have opted
instead for more strict and inﬂexible resource management
policies. For example, FLAME [6] bounds the execution
time of measurement modules using a cycle counter, while
Scriptroute [7] runs each measurement task on an independent
resource-limited sandbox, with no local storage access and
limited execution time, memory and bandwidth. The inﬂexible
solution of simply limiting the amount of resources in advance
can result in poor accuracy due to excessive and arbitrary
packet drops, and does not allow the system to degrade
gracefully in the presence of overload.
In the Internet services space, SEDA [20] proposes an
architecture to develop highly concurrent server applications.
SEDA implements a reactive load shedding approach by
dropping incoming requests when an overload situation is
detected. In [9] we show that, in a network monitoring system,
a predictive approach can signiﬁcantly reduce the impact of
overload compared to a reactive one, given the extremely high
data rates typically involved in network monitoring.
III. BACKGROUND
In this work we use the CoMo platform [5] as a case study
to evaluate our load shedding methods. CoMo is a modular
open source network monitoring system that allows users
to easily develop network monitoring applications as plug-
in modules written in the C language. The plug-in modules
can contain the code needed to answer a particular network
trafﬁc query or even complex monitoringapplications,1 such as
systems for intrusion and anomaly detection, trafﬁc accounting
and classiﬁcation, network performance evaluation, billing and
pricing, etc. More details about the CoMo platform can be
found in [5].
In order to provide developers with maximum ﬂexibility,
CoMo does not restrict the type of computations a plug-in
module can perform nor the data structures it can use. As a
consequence, the load shedding scheme in CoMo must operate
1In the rest of the paper, the terms monitoring application, plug-in module
and query are used interchangeably.3
Fig. 1. Load shedding subsystem
only with external observations of the resource requirements
of the modules, because the platform considers them as black
boxes. Moreover, the CoMo system is open in the sense
that any user can submit a plug-in module to the network
infrastructure and cause arbitrary resource consumption at any
time. Therefore, such an open infrastructure must manage its
resources carefully in order to assure fairness of service and
offer a graceful performance degradation in the presence of
overload. The resource management problem is even harder
considering that the input network trafﬁc is also arbitrary and
bursty in nature, with sustained peaks that can be orders of
magnitude greater than the average trafﬁc. Thus, it is also
important that the load shedding scheme in CoMo does not
rely on a speciﬁc model for the input trafﬁc.
A. Prediction Methodology
Without any a-priori knowledge of the plug-in modules,
the load shedding scheme in CoMo infers the cost of each
module from the relation between its actual CPU usage and
a pre-deﬁned set of features of the incoming trafﬁc. A trafﬁc
feature is simply a counter that describes a speciﬁc property of
the input trafﬁc stream (e.g., number of packets, bytes, ﬂows,
unique IP destination addresses, etc.). The current version of
CoMo extracts about ﬁfty trafﬁc features online using CPU-
and memory-efﬁcient counting algorithms, such as multi-
resolution bitmaps [21]. A complete list of the trafﬁc features
supported in our current prototype is available in [9].
In CoMo, the input trafﬁc is grouped in ﬁxed-time batches
as shown in Figure 1. For each batch, the prediction system
extracts its trafﬁc features and measures the CPU cycles used
by each module to process it. With these previous observations,
the system builds an online prediction model for each plug-in
module based on a multiple linear regression (MLR), where
the response variable is the CPU usage and the predictor
variables are the values of the extracted trafﬁc features.
In order to reduce the overhead of running the MLR online
and increase the accuracy of the prediction process, we use a
variant of the Fast Correlation-Based Filter (FCBF) [22] that
allows the system to remove both redundant and irrelevant
features, before running the MLR.
Figure 1 shows the components and summarizes the oper-
ation of the prediction process. A complete description and
evaluation of the prediction method is available in [9].
B. Load Shedding
The load shedder in CoMo acts when the sum of the
predictions of all modules for a given batch exceeds the system
capacity. The advantage of a predictive load shedder is that
the monitoring system can shed excess load in advance before
being actually overloaded.
The load shedder applies packet or ﬂow sampling to the
incoming batches in order to reduce the load of the monitoring
system. In CoMo, apart from the sampling method, each query
q ∈ Q can provide a minimum sampling rate (mq) that indi-
cates its minimum accuracy requirements. The strategy used
by the CoMo load shedder [23] to select the sampling rates
(pq) of each query q ∈ Q consists of satisfying the minimum
sampling rate constraints of all queries and distributing the
remaining cycles in such a way that the minimum sampling
rate among all queries is maximized. In [23] we show that,
in an open network monitoring system, this strategy results in
better performance than the traditional approach of providing
fair access to the CPU used by typical OS task schedulers.
Depending on the query requirements and the system capac-
ity, an allocation that satisﬁes the minimum rate constraints of
all queries may or may not exist. When no feasible solution
exists, some queries have to be disabled. The strategy used by
CoMo to enforce that non-cooperative users provide correct
information about mq is to stop ﬁrst those queries with
greater resource demands. That is, those with greater values
of mq × b dq, where b dq is the prediction of the CPU cycles that
would be needed to process the current batch by the query q.
On the one hand, this (intentionally) simple strategy can
be applied online given that an algorithm exists to compute
the optimal solution in polynomial time [23]. On the other
hand, we demonstrated [23] that when using this strategy there
is a single Nash Equilibrium when all queries demand C
|Q|
cycles, where C is the system capacity in CPU cycles. In other
words, this solution intrinsically assures that no user has an
incentive of demanding more cycles than C
|Q| in a system with
capacity C and Q queries, which is exactly the fair share of C.
Moreover, given that |Q| and C are unknown for the users, this
strategy discourages them to provide minimum sampling rates
(mq) greater than their actual requirements, because it would
increase the probability of demanding more than C
|Q| and, as a
consequence, the probability of being disabled in the presence
of overload. This feature is very important because it allows
the monitoring system to maintain the accuracy of the queries
within bounds deﬁned by non-cooperative or selﬁsh users,
while still assuring a fair allocation of computing resources.
IV. CUSTOM LOAD SHEDDING
The load shedding strategy described in Section III assures
a fair allocation of resources to queries as long as all queries
are equally robust against the load shedding mechanisms
provided by the core monitoring platform (i.e., packet and ﬂow
sampling). However, this strategy penalizes those queries that
do not support sampling (e.g., signature-based IDS queries),
forcing them to set their minimum tolerable sampling rate
(mq) to 1. As a consequence, they have a high probability
of being disabled in the presence of overload since, according
to the strategy presented in Section III-B, the system stops ﬁrst4
those queries with greater resource demands when it cannot
satisfy the minimum sampling rates.
On the other hand, there are queries that, although being
robust against sampling, can compute more accurate results
using different sampling methods than those provided by the
core platform. For example, previous works have shown that
Sample and Hold [24] achieves better accuracy than uniform
sampling for detecting heavy-hitters. In that case, using packet
or ﬂow sampling would force these queries to use greater
values of mq than those actually needed when using other,
more appropriate sampling methods. This would result not
only in a waste of resources, but also in worse accuracy,
given that the query would have a higher probability of being
disabled during overload situations.
A possible solution would consist of including as many
load shedding mechanisms as possible in the core system
(e.g., lightweight summaries [13] or different sampling algo-
rithms [24]) to increase the probability of ﬁnding a suitable one
for any possible trafﬁc query the system receives. However,
this solution is not viable in practice for a system that supports
arbitrary network trafﬁc queries, such as CoMo, and it does
not allow for testing or deploying new load shedding methods.
We propose instead a simple yet effective alternative: to
allow the queries to provide their own, customized load shed-
ding mechanisms. This way, when a suitable load shedding
mechanism is not found for a given query, the system can
delegate the task of shedding excess load to the query itself.
Applications can potentially shed load in a more effective and
graceful manner than the monitoring system. For example,
they can take into account the particular measurement tech-
nique employed and the data structures involved in order to
implement a load shedding mechanism that has a lower impact
on their accuracy.
A. Enforcement Policy
In this solution queries are part of the load shedding
procedure, which raises additional fairness concerns. Similar
custom load shedding designs have been proposed for other
environments (e.g., [14]) where applications behave in a
collaborative fashion, a requirement that is not met in the
presence of non-cooperative users. For example, in such an
environment, there is no guarantee that queries will implement
their custom load shedding correctly, for malicious reasons or
otherwise.
Our solution instead consists of ensuring that queries shed
the requested amount of load by penalizing those that do
not shed it correctly. Although several policies would be
possible for this purpose [6], we empirically veriﬁed that
our prediction method inherently penalizes selﬁsh queries by
increasing exponentially their predicted cycles ( b dq) and thus
their probability of being disabled.
Figure 2(a) illustrates this property with a real example.
The line labeled as ‘selﬁsh prediction’ shows the predicted
cycles for a selﬁsh signature-based P2P ﬂow detector query2
2A description of this query and the packet trace used for this experiment
is available in Section V.
that does not shed any load, irrespective of the amount of load
shedding requested by the core. The ﬁgure conﬁrms that b dq
increases exponentially with the load shedding rate, instead
of remaining constant (note logarithmic axes). As a result,
the running probability of this query decreases exponentially,
because it depends directly on the value of b dq.
This interesting behavior is consequence of the way we
update the history maintained by the MLR to perform the
prediction. In particular, the value used to update the MLR
history is computed as
dq
1−rq, where dq stands for the actual
CPU cycles used by a query q ∈ Q and rq is the load shedding
rate requested by the core system. This correction is necessary
because the actual resource consumption of a query can only
be measured after shedding excess load.
It is then clear that the value of
dq
1−rq will increase ex-
ponentially if rq increases but dq is not reduced in the same
proportion(i.e., when q sheds less load than requested). For ex-
ample, the line labeled as ‘selﬁsh actual’ in Figure 2(a) shows
that the value of dq is almost constant (i.e., q never sheds
excess load), resulting in the mentioned exponential ramp on
the predicted cycles (‘selﬁsh prediction’ line). Therefore, users
have no option other than implementing their custom load
shedding mechanisms correctly, otherwise their queries will
not have any chance to run under overload conditions.
Note that the alternative of recomputing the trafﬁc features
used in [9], rather than scaling the CPU cycles, would be only
valid for those queries that use sampling as their load shedding
option, besides being computationally more expensive.
B. Implementation
Our current implementation offers two equivalent ways of
notifying the magnitude of load shedding to those queries that
implement a custom mechanism. First, it provides the query
with the load shedding rate (rq) to be applied, which is relative
to its current CPU usage. This rate is computed as 1 − pq,
where pq is obtained as described in Section III-B. Second, it
informs the queries about the absolute amount of CPU cycles
to be shed, which is simply computed as b dq × rq.
As an example, we implemented a custom load shedding
method for our previous example of a signature-based P2P
ﬂow detector query. Typically, the signatures employed to
detect P2P applications appear within the ﬁrst bytes of a
ﬂow [25], [26]. Therefore, an effective way to shed load is to
always scan the ﬁrst packet of a ﬂow and inspect subsequent
packets with probability 1 − rq. In order to efﬁciently detect
new ﬂows, we use a Bloom ﬁlter [27].
While this query could use packet or ﬂow sampling instead,
Figure 2(b) shows the notable improvement achieved after
implementing our custom-deﬁned load shedding mechanism.
Note that the error of this query is deﬁned as 1 minus the
ratio of the number of ﬂows correctly classiﬁed (according to
the results obtained with the same query when all packets are
inspected) and the total number of ﬂows. The error of 1 when
the load shedding rate is greater than 0.8 is due to the fact that
the query is stopped at that point, as we will explain shortly.5
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Fig. 2. Performance of a signature-based P2P ﬂow detector query when using different load shedding methods
Nevertheless, there are cases where reducing the amount of
computations by the load shedding rate does not guarantee an
equivalent decrease in the query’s CPU usage. For example, in
the case of the P2P detector query, there is a ﬁxed cost that the
query cannot reduce, which corresponds to checking/updating
the Bloom ﬁlter and scanning the ﬁrst packet of each ﬂow.
Figure 2(a) plots the prediction and actual resource usage of
this query when using the mentioned load shedding method.
The line labeled as ‘custom prediction’ shows that the pre-
dicted cycles still increase exponentially, although the resource
consumption decreases linearly (note logarithmic axes) with
the load shedding rate (‘custom actual’ line). This is a result
of the query shedding less load than requested by the core
system due to this ﬁxed cost, and therefore being penalized
by our prediction algorithm. Figure 2(c) shows the actual
resource usage of the query compared to that expected by
the core system as a function of the load shedding rate. The
ﬁgure veriﬁes that the query is actually shedding less load than
requested by the core.
In order to solve this practical problem, we allow the query
to inform the core system about this extra cost. This way, the
system can correct beforehand the amount of load shedding
requested to the query in order to compensate for this cost and
avoid exponential penalization. Assuming a linear relationship
between the load shedding rate and the resource consumption,
the core system computes the actual load shedding rate (rq) to
be applied to those queries that implement a custom method
as rq = min(1,r′
q/cq), where r′
q is the original load shedding
rate computed as r′
q = 1−pq, and cq is a value provided by the
query, which indicates the minimum load shedding rate from
which the query q is not able to further reduce its resource
consumption. When r′
q is greater than or equal to cq, the
query is disabled given that it cannot shed the amount of load
requested by the core system. In the case of the P2P detector
query, cq was obtained empirically as illustrated in Figure 2(c).
In particular, cq is 1 minus the ratio of cycles consumed with
a load shedding rate of 0 and those consumed with a load
shedding rate of 1, resulting in a value of cq = 0.82.3
3Although cq could be computed automatically by the core system from
previous observations, this option is not yet available in our implementation.
TABLE I
DESCRIPTION OF THE QUERIES USED IN THE VALIDATION
Query Description mq (cq)
application Port-based application classiﬁcation 0.03
autofocus High volume clusters per subnet [28] 0.51
counter Trafﬁc load in packets and bytes 0.02
high-watermark High watermark of link usage over time 0.10
p2p-detector Signature-based P2P detector [25], [26] 0.91 (0.82)
super-sources Sources with largest fan-out [29] 0.91
top-k Ranking top-k dest. IP addresses [30] 0.50
trace Full-payload packet collection 0.95 (0.49)
tuple Number of active ﬂows 0.03
Note that another option would consist of performing this
correction internally within the query. In fact, by implementing
it in the core system we are actually allowing both options,
since a query can always provide a value of cq = 1 and
perform the correction by itself.
Figure 2(a) shows the impact of applying the mentioned
correction to the load shedding rate. The line labeled as
‘custom-corrected prediction’ shows that, in this case, the
predicted cycles are constant and independent of the load
shedding rate being applied, which indicates that now this
query is shedding the correct amount of load, and therefore
is not penalized by our prediction algorithm. The ‘custom-
corrected actual’ line shows the actual resource consumption
of the query after applying the correction.
V. VALIDATION
In order to validate the load shedding scheme presented
in Section IV, we implemented it in the CoMo monitoring
platform and performed several executions using real-world
packet traces and a diverse set of trafﬁc queries.
A. Testbed Scenario
Table I brieﬂy describes the trafﬁc queries used in the
validation. The table contains the queries included in the
standard distribution of CoMo plus three additional (and more
complex) queries that we have expressly developed to validate
our proposal, namely uni-dimensional autofocus [28], super-
sources [29] and p2p-detector [25], [26].
While most queries use packet or ﬂow sampling, which are
provided by the core platform, two queries (p2p-detector and6
trace) implement a custom load shedding method. The p2p-
detector query uses the technique already described in Sec-
tion IV, which consists of dynamically reducing the number of
packets inspected per ﬂow. Instead, the trace query implements
a custom method based on dynamically reducing the number
of payload bytes collected per packet. The values of cq for
these queries are shown in Table I and they were computed
as described in Section IV.
Table I also presents the minimum constraints (mq) of those
queries that use trafﬁc sampling, which are set to the minimum
sampling rate that guarantees an average error below or equal
to 5% for each query.4 The error and mq constraints of the
queries are computed using the same methodology as in [23].
For our testing purposes, we collected two 30-minute
packet-level traces in November 2007 and April 2008 at the
access link of the Technical University of Catalonia (UPC),
which connects 10 campuses, 25 faculties and 40 departments
to the Internet through the Spanish Research and Education
network (RedIRIS). Real-time statistics of the trafﬁc traversing
this Gigabit Ethernet link are publicly available at [31].
Both traces contain the entire packet payloads, which are
needed to study those queries that require the packet contents
to operate (e.g., p2p-detector). The ﬁrst trace accounts for
95.2M packets, with an average data rate of 253.5 Mbps and
a peak rate of 399.0 Mbps, while the second trace contains
61.3M packets, with average and peak rates of 222.2 and 281.2
Mbps. The second trace will not be used until Section VII,
where we validate the online performance of the system.
B. System Accuracy
In order to show the beneﬁts of our custom load shedding
strategy (custom), we compare its performance to three differ-
ent load shedding alternatives. The ﬁrst alternative (no lshed)
consists of the original version of CoMo [5], which does
not implement any explicit load shedding scheme. Instead, it
simply discards packets without control as the buffers ﬁll in
the presence of overload. The second alternative (eq srates)
implements the simple load shedding strategy proposed in [9],
which assigns an equal sampling rate to all queries. That is,
in this system the amount of cycles allocated to each query is
proportional to its relative cost. Finally, the third alternative
(maxmin) implements the load shedding strategy proposed
in [23] and reviewed in Section III-B.
Throughout the validation we use the accuracy of the
queries as the performance metric to compare the different
load shedding alternatives. As in [23], we deﬁne the accuracy
of a query q ∈ Q as 1 − ǫq when pq ≥ mq and 0 otherwise,
where ǫq is the actual error of the query and pq is the sampling
rate. In order to make all systems comparable, the accuracy
of the no lshed system is assumed to be 0 when the error is
greater than 5%, given that the minimum constraints are not
considered in this system.
4Note that the value of 5% is arbitrary and is used just as an example to
validate our proposal. Similar conclusions would be also drawn with different
values for the maximum error. See [23] for additional discussion.
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Fig. 3. Average (top) and minimum (bottom) accuracy of the monitoring
system at increasing overload levels
The top plot in Figure 3 shows the average accuracy of the
various load shedding strategies as a function of the overload
level in the monitoringsystem. The overload level K is deﬁned
as 1 minus the ratio between the system capacity and the sum
of the query demands. In order to simulate the different levels
of overload in our testbed, we perform 10 executions ranging
the value of K from 0 to 1 (in steps of 0.1) by manually setting
the capacity of the monitoring system to C × (1 − K). C is
experimentally determined according to the minimum number
of cycles that assures that no load shedding is applied in our
testbed. Therefore, K = 0 denotes no overload (the system
capacity is equal to the sum of all demands), whereas K = 1
expresses inﬁnite overload (the system capacity is 0).
The ﬁgure shows a consistent improvement of around 10%
in the average accuracy of the custom system compared to
the best alternative (maxmin). This improvement is achieved
thanks to p2p-detector and trace that now implement a custom
load shedding method, and can therefore signiﬁcantly increase
their accuracy. This improvement is more evident when K
reaches 0.2, which is the point from which p2p-detector is
disabled in the maxmin system. Note that in the eq srates and
maxmin systems, p2p-detector and trace use packet sampling
and their mq constraints are set to the values shown in Table I.
The bottom plot in Figure 3 shows the minimum accuracy
among all queries. The improvement in the minimum accuracy
is much more signiﬁcant than in the average case. In particular,
the minimum accuracy is sustained above 0.95 until K = 0.8,
when the p2p-detector query is stopped. This result conﬁrms
than the custom system is signiﬁcantly fairer in terms of
accuracy than the other alternatives, given that the trace and
p2p-detector queries can now compete under fair conditions
for the shared resources with the other queries. Note that in
the best of the other alternatives, the accuracy of at least one
query is already zero when K reaches 0.2.7
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Fig. 4. Performance of a network monitoring system that supports custom
load shedding and implements the maxmin strategy
On the other hand, the good performance of the original
version of CoMo when K = 0.1 is explained by the fact that
the capacity of this system is slightly larger than the rest, since
it does not incur the additional load shedding overhead. The
poor performance of the eq srates system is also expected,
given that it is not designed to consider the minimum sampling
rates, resulting in a large number of violations of the minimum
constraints, even when K = 0.1.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section we evaluate the performance of our custom
load shedding strategy in a fully operative network monitoring
system. With these experiments we verify that, even when
delegating the task of shedding excess load to non-cooperative
users, the system is able to achieve robustness and a high
degree of accuracy.
A. Performance under Normal Trafﬁc
We ﬁrst evaluate the performance of our custom load
shedding scheme under normal trafﬁc conditions. Figure 4
plots ﬁve different system performance parameters over time
(i.e., predicted and actual CPU usage, prediction error, system
delay, system accuracy and load shedding overhead, respec-
tively) when running the nine queries on our ﬁrst trace.
The ﬁrst two plots show the time series of the predicted
cycles per second compared to the actual CPU usage and
the prediction error. The bold horizontal line depicts the total
CPU cycles allocated to CoMo, which in this experiment are
set in such a way that the overload factor is K = 0.5 in
average during the entire execution. The ﬁgure shows that
the prediction error is very low, resulting in an overall CPU
usage (‘actual’ line) very close to the limit of available cycles
(‘cycles available to CoMo’ line).
The third plot (‘delay’) shows the delay of the system
compared to the real time. In principle, the delay should be
at least 0.1s, given that batches contain 0.1s of trafﬁc [9].
This ﬁgure gives us a measure of the buffer size required to
avoid packet losses in the case of running the system on a
real link. The ﬁgure shows that the delay is almost constant
and centered in 0.2s, indicating that the system is stable and
only requires a buffer able to hold two batches, the one that is
being processed and the next one. On the contrary, the delay
in an unstable system would increase without bound.
The fourth plot (‘system accuracy’) shows the overall accu-
racy of the system over time, which is computed as the sum
of the accuracy for all queries divided by the total number
of queries. The ﬁgure shows that the overall accuracy of the
monitoring system is very close to the maximum value of 1,
even when the system is highly overloaded.
Finally, the bottom plot (‘overhead’) shows the overhead
over time of the load shedding subsystem. The overhead is
constant (about 7%) although the predicted cycles are quite
variable (as shown in the top plot), thanks to the space-efﬁcient
algorithms used in the feature extraction phase, which have a
deterministic worst case computational cost. The few spikes
in the overhead are caused by context switches during the
execution of the load shedding procedure.
B. Robustness against Trafﬁc Anomalies
The performance of a network monitoring system can be
highly affected by anomalies in the network trafﬁc. For exam-
ple, a system can be underutilized for a long period of time
and suddenly become highly overloaded due to the presence
of a Distributed Denial-of-Service attack (DDoS) or a worm
spread. During these situations, the results of the system, even
if approximate, are extremely valuable to network operators.
In this experiment, we evaluate the impact of network
anomalies on the robustness of the monitoring system. In this
particular example, we inject a massive DDoS attack every
3 minutes into our traces. The attack consists of injecting 1
new ﬂow, with spoofed IP source addresses and ports, for
every 3 ﬂows already existing in the original trace. Although
each attack lasts 1 minute, the prediction history is set to 6
seconds. Therefore, when a new attack arrives after 3 minutes
the system has forgotten all previously observed attacks.
Figure 5 plots the predicted and actual CPU usage together
with the system accuracy and delay during the attacks. The
ﬁgure shows that the predicted cycles increase signiﬁcantly
during the anomaly (note logarithmic scale in the top plot)
since the queries that depend on the number of ﬂows in the
trafﬁc (e.g., p2p-detector) are highly affected by this type of
attacks. However, the system is stable during the anomaly
and its impact on the overall system accuracy and delay is
negligible. Note also that although the prediction accuracy is
somewhat affected at the end of each attack, all prediction
errors are overestimations, given that the delay of the system
decreases when the prediction error increases.
Another interesting behavior is the decrease in the actual
CPU usage and delay during the ﬁrst two attacks. The cause
of this behavior is that the ﬁxed cost (cq) of the p2p-detector
query is highly affected by these attacks, given that the ﬁrst
packet of each ﬂow is always inspected. As a consequence, the
core system detects that the query is not shedding the correct
amount of load during the ﬁrst anomalies and proceeds to
penalize the query increasing its prediction as described in
Section IV. Nevertheless, this situation has no impact on the8
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Fig. 5. Performance of the network monitoring system in the presence of
massive DDoS attacks
accuracy of the other queries running on the system, as can
be observed in the bottom plot of Figure 5.
C. Robustness against Selﬁsh Queries
One of the critical aspects of our custom load shedding
strategy is that the monitoring system has to operate in a
non-cooperative environment with selﬁsh users. Therefore, the
enforcement policy presented in Section IV-A is crucial to
achieve robustness and assure a fair allocation of computing
resources to queries.
In this experiment, we evaluate the robustness of our
enforcement policy in the presence of a selﬁsh query. In
particular, the selﬁsh behavior is simulated by employing a
custom load shedding method that never sheds excess load,
irrespective of the amount of load shedding (rq) requested
by the core platform. We modiﬁed the p2p-detector query
to implement this selﬁsh custom load shedding method. The
resulting query is then submitted to the monitoring system
every 3 minutes and withdrawn after 1 minute. Initially, the
system is running the remaining eight queries listed in Table I
and it is not experiencing overload. Note that the p2p-detector
query is the most expensive in Table I, with a cost more than
10 times greater than the rest of the queries.
Figure 6 shows that this selﬁsh query is quickly penalized
and does not have any chance to run after very few observa-
tions of its selﬁsh behavior. Note also that the system would
have enough cycles to run a version of the same query that
implements a correct load shedding method instead.
The bottom plot shows the overall system accuracy without
including the selﬁsh query and conﬁrms that the impact of this
query on the accuracy of the rest of the queries is negligible.
In subsequent arrivals, the query is never executed again, given
that the system still maintains its MLR history for some time.
This additional check to identify the query is simply done by
computing a hash of the query binary code.
VII. OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCES
The objective of this section is to validate the results
obtained through packet traces in an operational network with
live network trafﬁc. We deploy our monitoring system in the
access link of the university presented in Section V-A and
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Fig. 6. Performance of the system when receiving a selﬁsh version of the
p2p-detector query every 3 minutes
run online the nine queries described in Table I. We present
the results of a 30-minute execution of our monitoring system
in an Intel Xeon running at 3 GHz. In order to measure the
accuracy of the queries, we also deploy a second computer that
receives an exact copy of the trafﬁc traversing the monitored
Gigabit Ethernet link using a pair of optical splitters. This
additional computer only collects a packet-level trace without
loss. Details of this trace are available in Section V-A. Both
computers are equipped with an Endace DAG 4.3GE card [16]
and their buffers are set to 256 MB.
Figure 7(a) plots the time series of the CPU cycles con-
sumed by the monitoring system to process one second of
trafﬁc (i.e., 10 batches) together with the predicted cycles and
the overhead of our load shedding scheme over time. It is
clear that the monitoring system is highly overloaded since
the predicted load is more than twice the total system capacity.
The prediction increases over time due to the increase in the
network trafﬁc, as can be observed in Figure 7(b).
The ﬁgure conﬁrms that our load shedding system is able
to keep the CPU usage of the monitoring system consistently
below the 3 GHz threshold, which marks the limit from which
the system would not be stable. It succeeds in predicting
the increase in the CPU demands and in adapting the CPU
usage of the queries accordingly. Figure 7(c) shows how the
average load shedding rate increases with the trafﬁc load.
Moreover, during the entire execution, the CPU usage is very
close to the limit of available cycles, which indicates that the
predictions are accurate and the system is shedding the bare
minimum amount of load. The CPU usage only decreases a
little bit at the end, when the predicted load is so high that the
minimum requirements of all queries cannot be satisﬁed for
some batches, and the p2p-detector (the most expensive query)
is sometimes stopped to avoid uncontrolled packet drops.
As a result, Figure 7(b) shows that the occupation of the
incoming buffer of the DAG card is controlled around 5 MB
(2% of the total buffer size) and only reaches values of up to
50 MB at the beginning of the execution when the prediction
system is still not trained. Since the buffer limit is never
reached, no packets are dropped by the DAG card during the
entire execution as depicted in Figure 7(b).
Figure 7(c) plots the overall accuracy of the queries over9
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Fig. 7. Online performance of the load shedding scheme over time when running the monitoring system at the UPC access link
time. As expected, the accuracy is very high, even when the
system is more overloaded,given that the minimum constraints
of all queries (except p2p-detector) are preserved and not a
single packet is dropped without control.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we presented a load shedding framework that
allows monitoring applications to use custom-deﬁned load
shedding methods. This feature is very important to those
applications that are not robust against the sampling methods
provided by the core platform and to those than can achieve
better accuracy by using other, more appropriate, techniques.
The main novelty of our approach is that the monitoring
system can still achieve robustness and fairness of service in
the presence of overload situations, even when delegating the
task of shedding excess load to untrusted applications. The
proposed method is able to police applications that do not
implement custom load shedding methods correctly using a
lightweight and easy to implement technique, given that the
enforcement policy is an intrinsic feature of the prediction
algorithm used by the load shedding scheme.
We validated our solution to support custom load shedding
methods using real-world packet traces and evaluated its online
performance in a large university network. We also showed the
robustness of our load shedding scheme in front of extreme
overload conditions, anomalous trafﬁc and selﬁsh applications.
Our ongoing work is focused on extending our methods
to address the resource management problem in a distributed
network monitoring system. We are also interested in applying
similar techniques to other system resources, such as memory,
disk bandwidth and storage space.
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